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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Considering  the  on-going  strive  towards  new,  alternative  indicators  to  measure  our societal  development
pathways,  and  the fact that policy  indicators  remain  largely  enigmatic  with  regard  to  their  patterns  of
embeddedness  in institutional  decision-making  processes,  it appears  necessary  to work  towards  reduc-
ing our  lack  of  understanding  of  their  interactions  with  policy-making.  In  the  present  paper,  we focus  on
exploring  the  significance  of  composite  indicators  for policy  making  in the particular  policy  environment
of  the  EU-institutions.  Our  research  is  underpinned  by the  conviction  that  such  indicators  are  not  system-
atically  used  directly,  but  have  an indirect  influence  on  policy  making  that needs  to be better  understood.
Our  analytical  framework  – in order  to analyse  the ways  in  which  composite  indicators  enter  policy  pro-
cesses  – is  characterised  by the distinction  between  the  ‘use’  and  the  ‘influence’  of  indicators  on  the  one
hand,  and  on  the  other  hand  between  3  types  of  factors:  indicator  factors,  policy  factors  and  user  factors.
Our  empirical  results  show  that  while  most  of  the  academic  attention  and  political  debate  around  indi-
cators  has  tended  to focus  on ‘indicator  factors’,  such  quality  attributes  actually  mattered  relatively  little
in our  setting  as determinants  of indicator  influence.  This  rejects  the idea that  the  robustness  of  evidence
would  lie  exclusively  in its technical  quality  and  in the  independence  of  its  producer,  and  instead  calls
attention  to  the  processes  of evidence-construction.  Simultaneously,  ‘user  factors’  (beliefs  and  represen-
tations  of  policy  actors)  and  ‘policy  factors’  (institutional  context)  were  crucial  as  explanatory  factors  of
the  policy  mechanics  we  identified.
© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We  live in a period of indicator abundance in virtually all policy
domains, and with an intensifying public and expert-based debate
(Stiglitz et al., 2010; OECD, 2011; CEC-COM, 2009; FAIR, 2008) on
the choice, configuration and development of indicators to measure
our societies’ development. Nevertheless, policy indicators remain
largely enigmatic with regard to their patterns of embeddedness in
institutional decision-making processes (Innes, 1998; Ayres, 2000;
Gudmundsson, 2003; Lehtonen, 2004; Hezri and Dovers, 2006;
Rosenström, 2006; Boulanger, 2007; Rydin, 2007; Turnhout et al.,
2007; Bauler, 2012).
Considering the on-going strive towards new indicators,
reducing our lack of understanding of their interactions with
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 26504924.
E-mail addresses: lea.sebastien@univ-tlse2.fr (L. Sébastien), tbauler@ulb.ac.be
(T. Bauler).
policy-making appears necessary. We  still know little about how
and why  policymakers, stakeholders and citizens use indicators in
general, and composite indicators in particular and, more impor-
tantly, whether the indicators actually influence policy and society
at large. In the present paper, we focus on exploring the significance
of composite indicators for policy making. These particular indi-
cators aggregate diverse information on a sector area, and result
in fine in providing the basis for its ranking, which in turn often
allows to compare the outcomes of public policies. Composite indi-
cators are repeatedly described as being straightforward to use as
signal-makers. Because of their apparent ‘simplistic’ design and
the unambiguous message they advance, composites are meant to
impact on the specific fringe of high-level policy-makers as well
as on the general public/stakeholders. These indicators have the
advantage of being encompassing, but the disadvantage of being
difficult to decrypt and analyse, because they highly condense
messages, i.e. reality. If the ‘offer’ of composite indicators in the sus-
tainable development domain (SDI-C) is substantial, i.e. the sheer
number of SDI-C which are developed and published, our generic
1470-160X/$ – see front matter ©  2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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research question is to attempt to qualify the ‘demand’, i.e. the
reception of the messages by those policy actors who act within
the policy arenas (Sebastien and Bauler, 2010).
What’s the significance of composite indicators for sustaina-
bility (SDI-C) at EU-level? We  aim to characterise the uses
(including processes of ‘non-use’ or ‘misuse’) and influence of SDI-
C by decision-makers at the EU-level and to understand the social
network in which these indicators are embedded. Empirically the
focus on composite indicators has a double advantage over disag-
gregated indicators or indicator lists: composite indicators have at
least one relatively clear target-user group (i.e. high-level policy
makers) and a relatively specific function (i.e. to draw attention
to a policy problem). These inherent characteristics of compos-
ite indicators help to circumscribe the boarders of an empirical
exploration of how composite indicators link to policy. Our field of
exploration is further delimited by the policy domain to which the
composite indicators we explore belong; we exclusively investigate
the linkage to the ‘sustainable development’ policy agenda at the
European decision-making level. This case study has been studied
in the three-year EU-funded research project POINT (policy influ-
ence of indicators), which examined the roles that environmental
and sustainability indicators play (or indeed fail to play) in policy-
making in different countries, domains and at various scales. Our
research is underpinned by the conviction that indicators are not
systematically used directly but have an indirect influence on policy
making that needs to be deeply studied. Our empirical exploration
of the use and influence of composite indicators in policy-processes
intends to elucidate the mechanics which built up around indi-
cators as being part of governance processes, and, the ‘politics of
policy indicators’ (Bauler, 2012).
Section 2 below presents the theoretical context, followed by
our framework and methodology in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 are
devoted to our results and discussions.
2. Theoretical contextualisation
Indicators have been defined as “variables that summarise
or otherwise simplify relevant information, make visible or per-
ceptible phenomena of interest, and quantify, measure, and
communicate relevant information” (Gallopin, 1996, 108). As a
specific form of operationalising the concept of evidence-based
policy, indicators are seen to serve multiple functions, in partic-
ular those of communication and awareness-raising (Rosenström
and Lyytimäki, 2006, 33), providing early warning functions, polit-
ical advocacy, and improving the quality of decisions. Whichever
the primary objective, indicators are expected to reduce ambigu-
ity. As knowledge-agents, indicators are expected to communicate
evidence in a form suited for policy actors by simplifying the
description of complex systems, either through reducing the num-
ber of key variables observed (McCool and Stankey, 2004, 295)1
or by building clear, unambiguous and well-defined visions of the
desired future (Hardi and Zdan, 1997).
These expectations of indicator functions are habitually rooted
in a rationalistic and linear conception of the instrumental role
played by knowledge in decision-making, entailing the assumption
that more efficient policy outcomes will result if robust, data-
driven, presumably objective and value-free evidence is made
available for policymakers, in a simplified and synthesised format.
By clarifying issues and reducing scientific uncertainties, indicators
would hence provide a shared factual basis for policy discussions,
and enhance the rationality of decision-making and the quality
1 McCool and Stankey (2004, 295) argue that “a basic purpose of indicators is to
reduce complex, poorly understood systems to a limited number of variables that
presage impending changes in life support and management systems.”
of decisions2. The underlying logic can therefore be described as
one of better information (because robust and simple) for better
decisions (because effective and efficient). In this perspective, indi-
cators are frequently conceived of as consensus-building tools –
essential instruments in attempts to pacify conflict and domes-
ticate controversy, which are seen as time-consuming obstacles
to efficient policymaking. Such domestication would be achieved
through the establishment of norms, standards, criteria and proce-
dural rules for monitoring and regulation (Chateauraynaud, 2011,
195). The linear model that sees indicators exclusively in such
an instrumental role still prevails as the main narrative in policy
practice (Owens et al., 2004). However, research on knowledge use
(Vedung, 1997; Weiss, 1999) has demonstrated that knowledge sel-
dom plays such a straightforward role in policymaking, but far more
often influences policies through indirect and largely unforeseen
pathways, gradually shaping frameworks of thought or serving as
ammunition in political battles. In contrast with the dominance
of rationalistic approaches to the analysis of indicators, our paper
draws attention to the various indirect ways in which indicators
come to exert their influence.
3. An analytical framework for the exploration of use and
influence of SDI-Cs
3.1. Distinguishing between use and influence
The first level of our analytical framework to analyse the ways in
which indicators enter policy processes is the distinction between
the ‘use’ and the ‘influence’ of indicators. The separation of use
and influence draws on evaluation research, notably on Mark and
Henry (2003), who argue that while indicator use does not auto-
matically lead to impact, likewise an indicator can significantly
influence policy and society without anyone actually consciously
‘using’ the indicator. We define use as the concrete act of hand-
ling the indicators in a policy context, whereas influence occurs
through dialogue and argumentation (Valovirta, 2002) – either dur-
ing the process of elaboration of indicators or subsequent to their
release. While ‘use’ traces back the original objectives, intentions
and strategies pursued by actors handling the indicator, ‘influence’
enables one to identify the ways in which indicators interact with
policymaking. Influence is therefore close to the concept of portée
(in english: ‘reach’ or ‘extension’), which Chateauraynaud (2011)
employs to qualify the role, status, and the actual strength of an
argument in a public controversy. Indicator ‘influence’/portée can
concern the targeted policy or broader processes in society, such
as administrative structures or the operation of democratic insti-
tutions. It can entail new or reconfirmed decisions and actions,
shared understandings, networking among policy actors or changes
in the legitimacy of policy actors (Mark and Henry, 2003; Lehtonen,
2005, 173). Often, however, the types of influence of indicators
might be very different from the intended use. For instance, indi-
cators might be developed with the objective of monitoring the
evolution of a particular variable (say, the share of solar power
in national energy production) deemed to provide information on
policy effectiveness (in promoting the production of renewable
energy). However, the publication and use of the ‘solar power’-
indicators might trigger a much wider than intended discussion on
2 Examples of such perception of indicators as objective measurement tools are
easy to find in the literature. The developers of the Environmental Sustainability
Index (ESI) argue that “[t]he ESI moves us towards a more analytically rigorous
and data driven approach to environmental decision making” (Devitt and DeFusco,
2002), while the organisation “Redefining Progress” (2003) declared that it sought
to  “measure the real state of our economy, our environment, and social justice with
tools like the Genuine Progress Indicator and the Ecological Footprint”.
Author's personal copy
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the environmental impacts of the production and recycling of solar
panels, and hence raise questions about their public acceptance –
an outcome in terms of the influence of the indicators which is at
least partly contrary to the objectives of the solar power advocates.
Summing up, ‘influence’ enables the identification of the ways in
which indicators interact with policymaking, whereas ‘use’ traces
back the objectives and intentions pursued by actors handling the
indicator.
Use and influence have their instrumental dimensions (as seen
earlier) but, more importantly for our paper, also their concep-
tual and political dimensions. Conceptual use and influence occur
when indicators help to constitute a broad information base for
decisions by shaping conceptual frameworks, mostly through dia-
logue, public debate, and argumentation. An indicator, or a set of
indicators, hence provides general background information, lead-
ing to “enlightenment” among policy actors, i.e. “the percolation of
new information, ideas and perspectives into the arenas in which
decisions are made” (Weiss, 1999), and shared understandings
(Innes, 1998). In this way, indicators would affect decision-makers’
and other policy actors’ problem definitions, and provide new
perspectives and insights, rather than targeted information for
a specific point in decision-making, or to a hypothetical single
decision-maker. Given the complexity and uncertainty as well as
the diversity of normative standpoints involved in policies concern-
ing sustainable development, it can be argued that sustainability
indicators most often provide shared concepts and open up a range
of alternative perspectives, rather than produce conclusive assess-
ments of specific policy options.
Lastly, indicators are frequently subject to and generate overtly
political use and influence, helping to justify or legitimise policies,
decisions and actors or postpone decisions. Ortega-Cerdà (2005)
mentions the symbolic function of the processes of knowledge cre-
ation as substitutes for action or as a delaying tactic. Knowledge is
then used to justify pre-determined positions, in order to persuade
politicians, civil servants, stakeholders or public at large typically
about policy plans that are already well on their way towards
implementation (Hezri and Dovers, 2006; Patton, 1997). Indicators
would hence constitute a fac¸ ade intended to give the impression of
a rational organisation that sets goals, is prepared for change, has a
serious and competent management, and takes rational decisions
on the basis of data which is it about to construct (Pollitt, 2006). In
extreme cases, indicators can be ‘misused’ by distortion or the omis-
sion of significant elements (Weiss et al., 2005). However, given the
essential role of justification and persuasion in political decision-
making (Valovirta, 2002), far from mere illegitimate manipulation,
political use and influence can also constitute an essential source of
democratic legitimacy, or a form of advocacy for socially progres-
sive objectives, such as sustainable development (Parris and Kates,
2003; Holden, 2008).
3.2. Identifying explanatory factors
The second level of our analytical framework strives to explain
the observed use and influence patterns through three explanatory
factors, following Pregernig (2000), who suggested that knowl-
edge uptake is governed by three factors: (a) the information itself
(what we call the ‘indicator factors’, related to the various quality
attributes of the indicator), (b) the knowledge and experience of
the receiver (here, the ‘user factors’, notably the ‘repertoires’ (van
der Meer, 1999) of the actors involved), and (c) the external settings
(‘policy factors’, denoting the general policy context).
‘Indicator factors’ include the quality and structuring of data,
selection of the variables, weighting schemes, timeliness, robust-
ness of the methodology, availability of accurate and appropriate
data sources, methods of communication, construction, aggrega-
tion and presentation of indicators. The criteria relating to the
quality of indicators include the conventional determinants of
scientific data: validity, reliability, specificity, and sensitivity to
changes in the factor of interest. The underlying assumption here
is that when information is “relevant, timely and comprehensible,
it will be used” (Romsdahl, 2005).
‘User factors’ describe the repertoires – a concept that encom-
passes actor expectations, belief systems (Sabatier, 1991), mental
models and the more operational codes and practices of organi-
sations. Repertoires can be conceptualised as “stabilised ways of
thinking and acting (on the individual level) or stabilised codes,
operations and technology (on other levels)” (van der Meer, 1999,
390). At the individual level, an actor positions himself person-
ally in relation to an indicator after having read, digested and
interpreted it (Hezri and Dovers, 2006); at the collective level,
repertoires relate in particular to the degree to which the use of
indicators is part of an organisation’s operational routines. A crucial
element of user factors relates to the implicit or explicit conceptual
model underpinning an indicator: to what extent does the way in
which an indicator frames the reality and the problems in question
correspond to the conceptual framework of the users and other
actors involved? Repertoires are important in that they govern the
choices that users make among the multitude of information on
offer.
Finally, the type and degree of use and influence of indicators is
affected by the general political context in which the indicators
are being developed and used. Such ‘policy factors’ concern the
meta-setting within which indicators are being used and produced,
and include, in particular, the long-term framework conditions, the
short-term shifts in governing coalitions and the characteristics
of the policy issues at stake. An important aspect of the ‘policy
factors’ is the institutionalisation of indicators, that is, the set-
ting up of procedures and practices that allow for an indicator
to become a reference in policy processes, and which legitimises
and formalises the methods and concepts underpinning the indi-
cator (Innes, 1998). The degree and type of use and influence that
an indicator engenders are shaped by its relevance for specific
policy objectives and policy processes. Following Kingdon (1984),
one could hypothesise that the use and influence of an indica-
tor would be compromised if the policy problems it describes do
not adequately match with the prevalent policy ideas on the one
side, and do not face a favourable political environment on the
other.
These three sets of factors relate to three distinct, while interde-
pendent, levels of possible analysis. Policy factors depend largely
on the policy domain, user factors relate to the policy actors’ per-
ceptions, while indicator factors refer to the nature of the object,
i.e. the indicator. These three levels form the basis for our analysis
of the use and influence of SDI-C in policymaking.
To sum up (see Fig. 1 below), the degree to which an indica-
tor is used and/or influences policy instrumentally, conceptually or
politically depends to varying degrees on indicator, user and policy
factors. Our objective here is to depict the role of each explana-
tory factor in the various types of policy uses and influences of
SDI-C.
3.3. Empirical methodology: a qualitative approach to explore
indicator use and influence
We focused our empirical exploration on a set of 12 SDI-Cs,
each of which can be classified into one of the three dimensions
of sustainable development:
• Social sphere:  main focus on the Human Development Index
(HDI), additional attention was given to the Happy Planet Index,
Worldwide Governance Indicator, Human Well-Being Index.
Author's personal copy
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Fig. 1. Analytical framework.
• Environmental sphere: main focus on Ecological Footprint (EF),
additional attention to Living Planet Index, Ecosystems Well-
being Index, Environmental Performance Index.
• Economic sphere: main focus on Genuine Savings, (GS) additional
attention to Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, Corruption
Perception Index, Gini Index.
The three headline SDI-Cs (HDI, EF, GS) were prioritised by
the EU-level ‘Beyond GDP’-process (today relabelled as ‘GDP
and beyond’) as important featuring indicators3. Empirically, we
deployed 3 perspectives to our qualitative analysis: an individual
level (via face-to-face interviews); an interpersonal level (using a
‘participant-observer’ approach), a collective level (via document
analyses).
In order to depict the use and influence of SDI-C at the individ-
ual level, an obviously important perspective to be explored when
trying to grasp the perception of policy-makers with regard to indi-
cators, we conducted 24 semi-structured interviews with high- to
mid-level policy-makers from the European Environment Agency,
DG Environment, DG Research, DG Education, DG Internal market
and EUROSTAT. The interview guide developed around the follow-
ing themes: decision- and policy making processes; sustainable
development and well-being indicators; the pertinence of indi-
cator aggregation; the configuration of an ideal SDI-C; the policy
targets, policy objectives and pertinent scale of SDI-C; the social
network around SDI-C; the interest, concern and trust towards SDI-
C; the ‘demand’-characterisation for SDI-C; the legitimacy criteria
for SDI-C.
In parallel to the face-to-face interviews, the participant-
observer approach has been implemented in a series of pre-
identified workshops and (international) conferences specifically
dedicated to debate the issue of EU-level indicators in 2009 and
20104. The objective was to observe interactions, dynamics, dis-
courses and representations of policy actors at these events, with
the aim to grasp what sort of messages policy actors publicly
defend, argue, and debate on the matter of SDI-C. Our empirical
setting enabled us to directly observe - via our focus on SDI-C -
the dispute of interpretations within the policy arena of SD (i.e.
what is the ‘vision’ of SD at EU-level?), and to indirectly observe
the dispute between policy arenas (i.e. where does SD stand with
regard to other ‘visions’ of the European development pathway?).
We are shifting from the individual level of perceptions (which was
the focus of our face-to-face explorations) towards the interper-
sonal level of the shared understanding of the use and influence of
SDI-Cs within policy processes, e.g. the role of SDI-Cs in the pro-
cesses of argumentation and dialogue among actors (persuasion,
legitimisation, criticism. . .)  (Valovirta, 2002).
3 http://www.beyond-gdp.eu/indicators.html.
4 Such as the Sustainable Development Indicators working group within
EUROSTAT (Luxemburg, 2009–2010); the OECD Worldforum (Korea, 2009); the
conference on Beyond GDP and Ecological footprint (Brussels, 2009); the EPIGOV-
project’s (Environmental Policy Integration and multi-level governance) final
conference (Brussels, 2009).
A third level of analysis was  implemented through document
analysis of formal, strategic policy documents5. These documents
speak for the collective level, i.e. they are collectively, politically or
scientifically accepted policy documents with an influence on the
configuration of policy arenas. The percolation of SDI-C was traced
throughout the entire policy processes by concentrating on the
identification of indicator-related content within these policy doc-
uments. The collective level examines outcomes in terms of policy
decisions and actions, shared beliefs and understandings, legiti-
macy of policies and actors, agenda-setting and network formation
(Mark and Henry, 2003).
When exploring our analytical framework, which collates 3 fac-
tors vs. use/influence of SDI-Cs, through these 3 different lenses of
the personal, interpersonal and collective levels, we were aiming
to depict the EU-level policy-makers’ perceptions (personal level),
their debates, discourses and conflicts (interpersonal level) and the
formal outcomes of the policy processes (collective level via docu-
ment analyses).
In the following, our results are organised in two parts. First,
we develop our results over the three levels of analysis (individual,
interpersonal, collective). Subsequently, we  discuss the roles of the
three different identified explanatory factors of indicator use and
influence (i.e. user, indicator, policy factors).
4. Results (part 1) – from perceptions to policy outcomes:
little evidence of indicator use
4.1. Individual level: identifying 3 confusions
The individual level developed into an important level of read-
ing when it comes to interpreting the use of indicators. In the end,
it is individuals who  are meant to operate, i.e. to use, the indica-
tors in their daily live as policy-makers. The fact that most of the
interviewed policy-makers had no memory of having “used” SDI-
Cs in their professional setting appeared through the interviews to
originate from 3 confusions.
First, most of our EU-level policy-makers had a poor factual
knowledge of SDI-Cs in general. The interviewed policy-actors gen-
erally had some basic knowledge only of the Ecological Footprint
(EF) and the Human Development Index (HDI). They often declined
to express their opinions even on these SDI-Cs, arguing that they
were not specialists of the sustainable development policy agenda.
Nevertheless, most of the interviewees explicitly stated that they
were interested and actively followed the European-level “Beyond
GDP”-process; this situation results from a confusion by the inter-
viewees to adequately separate a policy process on changing the
indicators from a policy process on changing the socio-economic
characteristics of our societies (i.e. “Beyond Growth”). The lack of
factual knowledge as well as of awareness of the nature of the SDI-C
related policy-process can simply be a sign of information over-
5 Lisbon strategy indicators; EU Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) indica-
tors; DG Environment indicators; Euorpean Environmental Agency (EEA) indicators;
GDP and beyond indicators; EU2020 indicators; the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report.
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flow: too many processes linked to too many indicators. On the
other hand, it is evident from the interviews that – at least partly
– power relations and vested interests may  induce policy-makers
to state non-existing ignorance and confusion (Sager and Ravlum,
2005; Flyvbjerg, 1998).
Second, the interviewed policy-makers did not feel directly con-
cerned by composite sustainability indicators. Again, this appears
partly surprising because SDI-Cs are specifically designed for both
policy-makers and society at large by aiming to provide a quick
message to non-specialists. Indicators of a more disaggregated
nature were claimed to be more influential than SDI-Cs. At this
level, the non-use of SDI-Cs can be explained by the fact that policy-
makers and the more general public effectively have different needs
in terms of indicators; that they should not be confused as an iden-
tical target group. Tailoring SDI-Cs for one or the other could be
essential. Indeed, the indicator producers were often seen as being
too ignorant of the specificities of the target group (i.e. the policy-
makers), being in general disinterested in the way in which their
indicators were received by the targeted users and about the type
of use that their indicator(s) might engender.
A third explanation for the minor (instrumental) use of SDI-
Cs is grounded in the acknowledgement by all our interviewees
that SDI-Cs can be confusing for being at the same time general
‘world visions’ and targeted evidence for policymaking. Our inter-
viewees argued that while indicator producers seek in principle to
match information-provision with policy-making needs in order to
allow timely and appropriate decision-support, SDI-Cs were advo-
cating a certain ‘world vision’ (e.g. the finiteness of environmental
resources), which is necessarily partisan and particular to a spe-
cific indicator producer. The policy-makers strongly underlined the
inherently subjective nature of indicators, arguing that just about
every step in indicator production and diffusion is arbitrary, a “mat-
ter of choice made by one particular actor at one particular time
for no particular reason”6. They argued that such subjectivity and
arbitrariness is even stronger for complex and poorly defined policy
issues such as sustainability, which remains subject to numerous
rival attempts of definition.
4.2. Interpersonal level: evident conflicts between policy-makers
The European Union’s institutions are a rather unifying policy
structure; Directorate-Generals, European Parliament, European
Council, European Agencies co-develop policies and the more
important of them are decided on a common basis. However, during
policy development and configuration – but also when it comes to
justifying passed decisions – debate does of course prevail among
policy makers, and it appears in these processes that our target indi-
cators are ‘dis-unifying’ tools. SDI-Cs stir the policy debates rather
than helping to settle them. The participant-observation of a series
of high- to mid-level policy events (e.g. conferences, workshops,
working groups) allowed to identify the nature of the conflicts
between policy-makers that are fought with the help of SDI-Cs. This
discourse-enhancing characteristic of SDI-Cs can be shown through
the fact that a relatively unambiguous competition exists between
the various indicators as proposed by specific DGs, Institutions and
Agencies. The observations revealed important inter-institutional
conflicts about choice, support and adequacy of potential SDI-Cs,
to an extent where individual EU-policy-makers appear to be less
in opposition with other, non-institutional stakeholder groups (e.g.
NGOs) than with their direct colleagues from within EU institutions.
When looking closely, the conflicting debate on SDI-C mir-
rors the fact that individuals in different EU-institutions carry
6 Quote of an interviewee.
differentiated representations about the meaning of sustainable
development. Weiss (1999) and Leknes (2001) purport that the pol-
icy influence of indicators is likely to be greater in consensual policy
domains of ‘professional’ character, as well as on policy issues that
have reached a status of high institutionalisation. Hence, despite
the fact that the EU-level has institutionalised ‘Sustainable Devel-
opment’ (SD) as one of its overarching policy goals through the
development of the EU-Sustainable Development Strategies (2001
and 2006), policy use of SDI-Cs might well be hampered because of
the lack of consensus on the meaning and content of SD as a policy
idea or policy domain. One of the alleged benefits of indicators is
their ability to provide focus and to enhance shared understand-
ing, for example around the goals of an organisation (Van Der
Knaap, 2006). In the case of SDI-Cs at the EU-level, this mecha-
nism does not appear to unfold unambiguously; the policy arena
of the EU-Sustainable Development Strategies seems to allow the
confrontation of different ‘world visions’, where the extent of use
of SDI-Cs appears to depend mainly on their potential for enhanc-
ing conflicts. One of the procedural consequences in terms of policy
outcomes is the difficulty of EU institutions to propose and agree
on a common set of composite featuring indicators.
4.3. Collective level: lack of appearance for lack of coordination
The document analyses unambiguously showed that SDI-Cs
are very rarely occurring even in the strategic, relatively vague
documents which were produced for the process around the EU-
SDS. Quite directly, this absence of SDI-Cs can simply be routed
in the fact that “there is currently no comprehensive environ-
mental indicator that can be used in policy debates alongside
GDP” (CEC-COM, 2009: 433), and that SDI-Cs are quite popularly
shelved in the environmental domain. A series of inter-institutional
debates over methodological issues around SDI-C, as well as around
the potential policy acceptance of composite indicators per se, is
implicitly apparent in the screened EU-level documents. But the
EU-Commission services (ahead of which Eurostat) continue to pre-
fer a wide list of non-aggregated indicators, complemented by a list
of headline indicators.
To a certain extent, EU-institutions recognise the existence and
potential of SDI-Cs, but without using them directly as a refer-
ence point in their publications. The document analyses reveal not
much more evidence on the debate around the 3 targeted main
SDI-Cs than stating that UNDP is at the origin of the ‘HDI’, that the
World Bank calculated ‘Genuine Savings’, and that several NGOs
developed the ‘Ecological Footprint’ (CEC-COM, 2009: 433). Other
relatively obvious SDI-C candidates, such as the ‘Index of sustain-
able economic welfare’ (ISEW), the ‘Living planet index’ (LPI) or the
‘Human wellbeing index’ (HWI), do not appear at all in official EU
documents.
While SDI-C are thus widely ignored in strategic EU-documents,
the wider policy arena is dedicated to the renewal of indicators,
i.e. states its engagement to replacing or complementing GDP and
using alternative indicators. The EU-institutions run their ‘Beyond
GDP/GDP and beyond’ process, cooperate with OECD on the redefini-
tion of the ‘Measure of social progress’, and explore methodological
avenues such as ecosystem services, material and social accounting.
The Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report (2010) has supported the debate
within the European indicators’ landscape, developing similar con-
clusions as the Commission’s “Beyond GDP”-communication: “GDP
does not measure environmental sustainability or social inclusion
and these limitations need to be taken into account when using it
in policy analysis and debates. The overall aim is to develop more
inclusive indicators that provide a more reliable knowledge base
for better public debate and policy making” (CEC-COM, 2009: 433).
The lack of use of SDI-Cs can also be related to the lack of effec-
tive coordination and harmonisation of policy processes across the
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various EU-institutions in their specific indicator work, and with
regard to SDI-Cs in particular. The message from the EU on sus-
tainability appears diffuse and unclear, and different indicator sets,
based on partially contradicting conceptualisations of sustainable
development, are proposed by different EU institutions7. As a result,
the EU policy on SDI-Cs remains characterised by multiple pol-
icy streams that seem to have little contact with each other (JRC,
2010). Even though individual indicator frameworks were elabo-
rated separately, i.e. intra-institutionally, many of the highlighted
policy-themes overlap. As a result, many indicators are common to
different frameworks. EU policymakers are potentially confronted
with indicators that cover more than 30 policy-themes and with
more than 250 indicators that are meant to assist them to assess
policies.
5. Results (part 2) – discussing influence against user-,
policy- and indicator-factors
5.1. User factors: explaining the conceptual influence of SDI-Cs
From the above, it occurs thus that SDI-Cs are hardly used instru-
mentally. SDI-Cs are nevertheless identifiable to be at the origin
of indirect, conceptual influence on policy-makers. Our empiri-
cal explorations reveal that SDI-Cs at EU-level tend to be used
as ammunition by policy actors, notably during their efforts to
legitimise specific political and societal positions, and in particu-
lar when arguing for or against specific visions and interpretations
of sustainability. SDI-Cs are tools which help to shape and share
visions, and can therefore be labelled ‘framework indicators’ or
‘framing indicators’, whose aim is to shape frameworks of thought,
mobilise action, as well as to shape and generate awareness and
symbolic images (Weiss, 1999; Amara et al., 2004). Innes and
Booher (2000) purport that “indicators do not drive policy. People
are not suddenly converted because they are confronted with data,
no matter how expertly or how collaboratively designed. Compen-
dia of indicators are not used by policy makers as aids to decision”.
Their generic finding appears to be applicable to the specific case
of SDI-Cs at the EU-level. The implemented 3-fold empirical explo-
rations show that SDI-Cs could shape policymakers’ worldviews,
and thereby potentially influence future decisions in a rather indi-
rect way. Rather than relying on theories or being linkable to
specific models of the human-nature system, which would allow to
question, quantify and organise the causalities within this system,
SDI-Cs can provide a conceptual framework, open for interpretation
and application, that helps to organise diagnostic and prescrip-
tive inquiry, and can provide a form of ‘meta-theoretical language’
enabling a comparison between theories (Ostrom, 1999). Such con-
ceptual framework indicators pursue the objective to stimulate
information flows that eventually will lead to collective under-
standing of emerging sustainability patterns (Sonntag, 2010). In
this sense, it appears adequate that our set of empirically explored
SDI-Cs are theory-driven and rely on a strong conceptual language,
allowing discussion on emerging paradigms rather than providing
unambiguous and targeted policy advice with regard to causalities.
The framework indicators appear to affect decision-makers’ prob-
lem definitions, and provide new perspectives on – and insights into
– the problem area, instead of providing information for a specific
moment of decision, or to a hypothetical single decision-maker.
SDI-Cs at EU-level produce primarily intangible effects (Gahin et al.,
2003), fuelling debates and helping to enlighten policy actors on
sustainability-related issues. SDI-Cs are not policy tools in the sense
7 The different indicator sets are apparent via the EU Sustainable Development
Strategy, the EU2020 Strategy, the Lisbon Strategy, and the set of indicators pub-
lished and profiled by DG Environment.
that they would constitute directly applicable evidence for policy-
making, but can instead be considered as conceptual references
that inform broader policy processes (Illner, 1984).
In these realms, user factors are of a particular importance
in understanding and in allowing the occurrence of this concep-
tual influence of composite sustainability indicators. As framework
indicators, i.e. evoking particular paradigms on SD, SDI-Cs need to
enable policy-makers to question stabilised codes and repertoires
and open new ways of representing reality to them. Our quali-
tative approach revealed that the acceptance of such framework
indicators by policy-makers is primarily conditioned by the level
of resonance of the indicator itself with the repertoires of its users.
The image of SDI-Cs being ammunition to the legitimisation of pos-
itions in on-going policy debates appears thus to be particularly
supported here.
5.2. Indicator factors: initialisation of policy debates via
discussing the quality of SDI-Cs
Contrary to the high degree of attention which is traditionally
given by the community of indicator producers to the consolida-
tion of the technical and methodological robustness of indicators,
our qualitative exploration of the influence of SDI-Cs reveals that
‘indicator factors’ matter little as direct explanatory factor for the
observed use and influence of indicators. In fact, a number of SDI-Cs
which are acclaimed for their methodological robustness remain
widely unused by policy-makers, while others, which might be
of poorer scientific quality, have been adopted to a certain stance
by policy-makers at EU-level. No clear scheme of influence arises
when the influence of SDI-Cs is explored against the acknowledged
(by the policy-makers) robustness of the set of SDI-Cs. However,
the empirical, qualitative exploration shows consistency in the
explanation of SDI-C influence when plotted against the acknowl-
edged methodological conflicts and interrogations which are raised
against specific SDI-Cs. In other words, the more methodologi-
cal conflicts revolve around an SDI-C, the better indicator factors
explain the observed influence. Consequentially, the influence of
an SDI-C seems to be conditioned more by the extend of the
negotiations between interest groups – a process during which
methodological argumentation would be mobilised – than by the
effective level of methodological robustness of the SDI-C (Cash et al.,
2002, 2003).
More specifically, the interviewed EU-policy makers criticised
quite extensively the ‘Ecological Footprint’ (EF), consistently refer-
ring to methodological problems, arguing for its inadequacy during
decision-making because EF is not pointing at specific policy
options, and regretting the non-inclusion in the EF of many cru-
cial aspects of environmental problems (presumably, for example,
issues linked to toxicity). Such ‘technical’ arguments against the EF
have been raised repetitively in literature, and are today hardly a
matter of contradiction. Interestingly, however, some interview-
ees explicitly highlighted the fact that some policy actors would
use these methodological issues on EF to ground their opposition
to a more formal adoption of the Ecological Footprint by the EU-
institutions, whereas their primary reason of opposition would
actually stem from the fact that the adoption of the EF would con-
siderably increase pressure for a radical change of policies – an
objective for which Europe would in their view not be ready.
In parallel, a consistent part of our interviewees sees in the HDI
a “GDP hybrid, a GDP a bit improved, a GDP with a lesser empha-
sis on economic variables8”. In that perspective, HDI might still be
viewed as a first step to move away from the tyranny of GDP, but
8 Quote of an interviewee.
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HDI is also accused of some form of hypocrisy, only simulating the
integration of social aspects into the index while keeping GDP in
a very central position. Interviewees acknowledged that the ori-
gin of the fairly good image of which HDI profits might actually be
linked to the fact that people are generally unaware of the presence
and causal influence of GDP within the composite’s calculus, lead-
ing some of the policy actors to label HDI a “masquerade”. Hence,
here the actual methodological content of the SDI-C appears to be
of minor importance than the image of its content.
In both examples, the methodological construction of SDI-Cs –
i.e. indicator factors – does thus play a role in the explanation of
indicator influence; but quite indirectly. While indicator factors do
not seem to exert a positive or negative influence on the choice of
the indicators to be used, they actually initiate debate about the
configuration of the visions of sustainability the SDI-Cs aim to rep-
resent. The minor direct explanatory force of indicator factors can
be interpreted according to Pielke (2007) along two  dimensions
which guide the uptake of scientific and expert knowledge in poli-
cymaking processes: 1◦ the degree of scientific uncertainty; and, 2◦
the potential for value consensus. Typically, SDI-C score equivocally
on both characteristics: 1◦ they contain a high degree of scientific
uncertainty, for instance about the correctness of causalities which
materialise in the aggregate indicators; 2◦ they reveal a relatively
high degree of conflict potential, since each SDI-C carries its specific
‘world vision’. On controversial policy issues, with disagreement on
values and goals, indicators that enable to narrow down the range
of policy options should thus have more potential for influence on
policy actors than SDI-C, which tend to exacerbate the conflicts
because they allow to support dispute on the representation to be
given to the generic policy idea. In other words, the EU-SDS arena
is in need for indicators which help to break down the policy idea
of SD into policy options, but quite on the contrary, SDI-C tend to
open up the debate because the inter-institutional interpretation to
be given to sustainable development is not consensual yet in itself.
The acknowledged policy influence of SDI-C could thus stem from
the fact that their inherent indicator characteristics tend to open-
up policy visions, rather than enable to close-down the struggle of
interpretations.
5.3. Policy factors: how the nature of the policy arena of SD
explains for the influence of SDI-Cs
The empirical exploration shows that ‘policy factors’ are central
in explaining the use and influence – or their absence – of indi-
cators. In effect, the meagre reported influence of SDI-Cs could
be simply attributed to the nature of the policy domain, seeing
in the use/influence dynamics of SDI-Cs a mirror-effect of the
dynamics more widely imposed on the policy agenda itself. ‘Sus-
tainable development’ as a policy agenda is claimed to have at least
partly failed to become an overarching reference point in EU-level
policymaking. For instance, unlike other EU-level policy agenda,
‘sustainable development’ is not centred on a narrow set of clearly
defined policy issues, but covers a relatively broad range of topics
in economic, social and environmental fields. The relatively eva-
sive, undefined nature of the policy-agenda itself would not easily
be conducive to provoke an intense flow of use and influence of
SDI-Cs.
The overall debate on SDI-Cs, or more widely on alternatives
to GDP, is profiting from a considerable and high-level echoing in
many EU-institutions. On the ground, it remains however difficult
to clarify with policy-makers the exact nature of the ‘demand side’
for SDI-Cs.
On the one hand, there is a relatively weak stated need for SDI-C
at the level of the interviewed policy-makers. SDI-Cs have gained
their appreciation not to help policy-makers in designing poli-
cies nor guiding specific system interventions, but rather to gain
knowledge of emerging or on-going wider policy debates (notably
on the necessity to replace or complement the hegemonic GDP).
In single cases, SDI-Cs were claimed to be used more classically
to compare the performances of regions or member-countries on
particular issues. Following Illner (1984), the relative constructed
complexity of composite indicators – as opposed to their relative
communicative simplicity – may  suggest that SDI-C have most
relevance during the early descriptive phases of a policy making
process, i.e. to identify gross policy problems. The evident fact that
there is no plethora of new policy problems, hence of policy debates,
that emerges every year on the EU-level could account for the fact
that policy-makers express a weak demand for SDI-Cs.
On the other hand, policy-makers state to be submerged by the
sheer number of SDI-Cs being proposed from many authors and
institutions. In this context, handling SDI-Cs can be particularly
demanding for policy-makers, because working with SDI-Cs, i.e.
using them, asks them at least implicitly to rally a particular strate-
gic positioning. In this context, SDI-Cs at EU-level are claimed to
function as tools to justify a posteriori and support otherwise hard-
ened policy choices, and not as incentive base to change policies or
decide on specific policy options.
From our explorations, the ‘demand’ for SDI-C by EU-level
policy-makers cannot be unambiguously qualified, and seems com-
paratively sparse, undefined, unsure and disparate against the
overwhelming presence of the SDI-C ‘offer’. An explanatory fac-
tor for the disequilibrium between ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ of SDI-C
can be found at the level of the original motivation to produce
and propose SDI-Cs in question. A number of the currently preva-
lent, ‘traditional’ composite indicators (among which not the least
GDP) were elaborated and produced by institutionally appointed
experts upon specific demand by policy-makers facing specific
policy situations. These traditional composite indicators can be
acknowledged as ‘top-down’ indicators, built on clear terms of
references (co-)defined by their pre-identified ‘users’. While such
demand-defined composite indicators continue to be elaborated
occasionally9, the largest part of the offer of SDI-Cs consists of indi-
cators, which are elaborated for policy-makers, but not by, nor with
them. The evolution of the more traditional ‘top-down’-movement
in the definition and configuration of composite indicators has
indeed evolved, partly under the influence of the emergence of
sustainability-rooted principles such as the acknowledgement of
the extension of the knowledge-base beyond the one existing
within expert circles (Fraser et al., 2006). Probably more directly,
the evolution of our informatics tools and the generalisation of
digital access to a broad set of data tremendously facilitated the
capacity of non-institutional actors (e.g. NGOs) to engage in the
elaboration of composite indicators. As a result, composite indi-
cators are increasingly proposed to policy-makers by a growing
variety of non-institutional policy actors10. An important number
of current SDI-Cs are therefore neither the result of ‘top-down’,
expert-driven institutional exercises, nor are these indicators rely-
ing on participatory processes and could be shelved as ‘bottom-up’,
citizen-defined, local and specific indicators (Fig. 2).
In fine, a growing number of SDI-Cs could be labelled ‘middle-
up’ and ‘middle-down’ indicators (Sebastien and Bauler, 2010);
they are initiated by stakeholder organisations such as NGOs or
Think Tanks, occasionally they originate in independent, academic
exercises but which are then further developed, fleshed and com-
municated by stakeholder organisations. These ‘middle’ actors are
9 For a recent example, see for instance the on-going construction of material-flow
indicators – and the underlying material-flow accounting frameworks – at EU-level.
10 See for instance, the Happy Planet Index by the New Economics Foundation, or
the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare which was  originally supported by
Redefining Progress.
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Fig. 2. Diffusion of SDI-C by “middle-actors” to top and bottom actors.
largely independent, non-institutionalised organisations, which
function as intermediate actors between civil society at large and
the political/institutional policy spheres. In this sense, the ‘Ecolog-
ical Footprint’ is a good example: elaborated and conceptualised
during a PhD thesis, EF was rapidly taken up by the World Wildlife
Fund and is today very controversially discussed (and taken up or
rejected) in statistical offices. In a wider interpretation of policy
processes, the ‘Mittelfeld’ actors (i.e. NGOs, Think Tanks, engaged
scientists) are the ones who  pre-configure the various ‘visions’ for
society (e.g. of the limits of our environmental resources), and
who reach out to advocate their visions towards ‘top’ (i.e. policy
actors) and ‘bottom’ (i.e. society at large). In this process, com-
posite indicators are much-welcomed tools which support the
communication of world visions. According to Weiss (1999), the
independence of the (information) media, as well as the strength
and the status of the NGOs and the civil society in general tend to
promote critical discussion in society, thereby potentially increas-
ing the influence of indicators. More particularly, in the case of
our set of SDI-Cs, most of the ‘Mittelfeld’-actors at the basis of
the SDI-Cs have first diffused their ideas (and indicators) hori-
zontally (i.e. between each other) in order to build a network of
coalitional actors, with the aim to propose at a later stage their
indicators to policy makers (‘middle-up’) and/or to civil society
(‘middle-down’). Along this reading of ‘Mittelfeld’ policy actors
coalitioning behind particular indicators, the degree of legitimacy
and credibility of the indicator-proposing actors plays a major role
in explaining the potential of influence of the indicators (Boulanger,
2007).
In such a context of conflicting and evolving policy arenas, strug-
gling for attention with the support of indicators, the interviewed
policy-makers at EU-level clearly stated their curiosity in wellbeing
as a new overarching policy concept, and their disinterest in the
somewhat overused concept of sustainable development. The so-
called Stiglitz report (Stiglitz et al., 2010) helped to initiate this
recent reflection on the way societies should think their futures
in line with rethinking their indicators. The notions of quality of
life, wellbeing, and social progress – and the associated indicators –
are slowly taking the role of sustainable development as the over-
arching normative concept of the ‘post-GDP society’. Like the 1987
Brundtland report for SD, the Stiglitz-report initiated an emerging
reflection on the way Europe should think its future, manage pri-
orities and measure development. Wellbeing and social progress are
put in the first row, whereas the core of the SD-conceptualisation,
i.e. environmental and resource-related objectives, are relegated
into means for wellbeing. This (r)evolution in policy arenas
(Boulanger, 2007) – in turn – appears to raise the interest of
our policy-makers in the forthcoming wellbeing-related composite
indicators; and could explain for some of the stated disinterest in
SDI-Cs.
6. Conclusion
Sustainability indicators are seldom used directly and instru-
mentally, but far more often influence decision-making through
various indirect and often slow processes. Among the most visible
examples of indirect influence were situations in which indicators
were used as ammunition in political debates. Experts (whether
independent or governmental) often seem to produce indicators
without a clear intended use or user in mind, and without regard
to the potential influence of the indicators. Combined with the
abundance of indicators, this increases the risk that policy makers
use only those indicators that suit their own interests, while con-
cealing other, potentially more relevant ones. Mismatch between
supply and demand is however not surprising. The SDI-Cs can be
described as tools specifically designed by groups of politically
engaged experts for purposes of political persuasion.
While most of the academic attention and political debate
around indicators has tended to focus on ‘indicator factors’, such
quality attributes actually mattered relatively little as determi-
nants of indicator influence. Sometimes conflicts between world
visions were hidden behind methodological debates on indicators.
And yet, even though ‘indicator factors’ were thus not decisive in
determining indicator influence, key user groups saw high technical
and scientific quality as an essential prerequisite for the determi-
nation of their intended use of indicators. Recommendations to
ensure that demand and supply meet each other include the sug-
gestion that indicator producers should not devote all their energy
to methodological aspects but study the potential receptivity of
their indicator. They should also try to metaphorically ‘optimise
the signal’, ‘improve the reception’ in the policy system or ‘increase
the bandwidth’ (Da Costa et al., 2008) to increase collaboration
between producers and users. But as Rice (2003) recalls, in a noisy
environment like the one of SD, a perfect signal might be impossible
to get. Chateauraynaud (2011) argues that the quality of evidence is
defined by the number of controversies that it goes through during
its lifetime. This view rejects the idea that the quality and robust-
ness of evidence would lie exclusively in its technical quality and in
the independence of its producer, and instead calls attention to the
processes of evidence-construction. From this perspective, strate-
gic and political use of indicators, manipulation or even abuse of
indicators is not necessarily a problem, but rather an essential part
of the production of valid and reliable evidence.
Likewise, in explaining the use and influence of SDI-Cs, ‘user
factors’ (beliefs and representations of policy actors) and ‘policy fac-
tors’ (institutional context) were crucial, whereas ‘indicator factors’
(quality of the indicators) played only a limited role. Our  findings
call to give greater attention to the various actors involved as well
as to the general political and institutional contexts in which indi-
cators are being produced.
Our results mirror the fact that SD is not a unifying policy idea
at the EU-level. If there seems to be a consensus about the the-
oretical idea of SD, our analyses reveal that the ways to achieve
SD are still controversial amongst producers of indicators, stake-
holders and even amongst EU institutions. As SD is not (anymore?)
the overarching policy framework at EU-level, SDI-Cs are rarely put
forward; the current reference policy documents appear to be the
Lisbon Strategy and the EU 2020 strategy rather than the EU-SDS.
The little reference given to SD is acknowledged to be further fading
out, and replaced little by little by a newer framework of reference,
i.e. the policy idea of ‘wellbeing’. At indicator level, the references
to ‘wellbeing’ have been advocated and popularised prominently
by the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report.
SDI-Cs are controversial because of the various visions of sus-
tainability existing in the policy arenas. We  show that SDI-C
are ammunition at the service of various stakeholders to legit-
imise a particular political and societal agenda, i.e. their ‘vision’
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of sustainability. SDI-C are ‘framework indicators’, enhancing the
conceptual and symbolic influence of data. They are theory-driven
and help discussing new paradigms without necessarily suppor-
ting systematic practical policy outputs. The objective is to reach
shared understanding and policy learning. One positive effect is
that SDI-C enhance discussions on the desirable state of our soci-
ety and environment. On the other hand, these controversies limit
the use of SDI-C because consensus is difficult to achieve regarding
such indicators. These overall opposing viewpoints generate a rela-
tively vague and unclear demand from policy makers for composite
indicators. On the one hand, high-level policy makers seem to
appreciate the fact that SDI-C are rather inadequate when it comes
to design policies, but are relatively suited to capture rapidly the
stakes of an issue. On the other hand, policy makers are being
overwhelmed by indicators coming from all sides and presenting
various facets of a policy problem.
There remain major gaps between indicator creators and users,
leading to misunderstandings between actors. However, there
were also internal quarrels within EU institutions about sus-
tainability indicators. The different institutions at EU-level do not
have the same visions of what should be measured regarding
sustainability in Europe. As controversy remains within EU’s insti-
tutions, many discussions are being run internally and SDI-Cs rather
exacerbate existing policy conflicts between EU-institutions. Nev-
ertheless, new types of governance processes are taking place in
parallel of the EU-debate, led by what we call “middle actors”. SDI-
C are currently being proposed actively by these types of actors (i.e.
‘Intermediate’-actors such as NGOs, think tanks, scientists, etc.) to
decision makers as well as to citizens. We  refer to these percola-
tion processes as being ‘middle-up’ and ‘middle-down’ indicators.
This latter observation should be given further attention by future
explorations: indicator pathways through social networks and the
longitudinal study of the percolation from one policy actor-level to
another might well provide for a further important refinement of
the policy use of composite indicators.
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